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THE FREE PRESS AND NATIONAL SECURITY:
RENEWING THE CASE FOR A FEDERAL SHIELD LAW
Alan Wehbé1
ABSTRACT
Freedom of the press is a cherished freedom enshrined in
the First Amendment and upheld in myriad contexts. However,
under the prevailing case law and without a federal shield law,
the executive branch may be able to “annex the journalistic
profession as an investigative arm of government” to reveal its
‘confidential’ sources as aid to prosecution. This would serve to
chill the freedom of the press and conflicts with the spirit of the
First Amendment. In many cases, courts have failed to extend
the common law to such protection. The legislative branch
should step in to make such protection clear. For example, in the
field of national security, where the stakes are so high, the
Government utilizes federal laws, such as the Espionage Act, to
prosecute so state shield laws provide inconsistent and
insufficient protection against federal prosecution. The case for a
federal shield law is heightened in the matters of national
security, which is different and where, arguably, the stakes are
higher. Based upon the aforementioned discussion, this Article
reinvigorates the argument in favor of a federal reporter’s shield
law, specifically implemented as an evidentiary privilege under
the Federal Rules of Evidence.

1
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Justice, National Security Division’s Office of Intelligence, and as a Judge Advocate
in the United States Army Reserves, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, where he
serves as an adjunct faculty member for the International and Operational Law
Department, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School. Mr. Wehbé
holds an LL.M in National Security and U.S. Foreign Relations Law from The
George Washington University Law School; a J.D. from Villanova Law School; an
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THE FREE PRESS AND NATIONAL SECURITY:
RENEWING THE CASE FOR A FEDERAL SHIELD LAW
By sunset on August 13, 2017, after a day of tensions and
sometimes-violent protests, three people died in Charlottesville,
Virginia.2 The event surrounded the highly charged decision by
the City of Charlottesville to remove the name and statue of
Confederate General Robert E. Lee from a local park. 3 The
ensuing legal drama of permits and city politics quickly took a
back seat to the human drama of protests, counter-protests, and
eventually the alleged murder of a woman in attendance that
day.4 In the immediate aftermath, many compelling legal and
societal issues surfaced (or resurfaced), such as whether to
identify the events as fueled by bigotry and hate and whether to
label the alleged murder as an act of domestic terrorism.5 The
magnitude of attention these events received clearly underscores
the importance in our national psyche of the First Amendment
and its protections on freedoms of expression, association, and
the press.6
I.

INTRODUCTION

Freedom of the press can be obliterated overnight by
some dictator's imposition of censorship or by the slow

2

Jason Hanna et al., Virginia Governor to White Nationalists: ‘Go home . . . Shame on
You,’ CNN, (Aug. 13, 2017, 1:34 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/12/us/charlottesville-white-nationalistsrally/index.html; see also Josh Blackman, The First Amendment on the Grounds in
Charlottesville, LAWFARE: FIRST AMEND. (Aug. 14, 2017, 2:00 PM),
https://lawfareblog.com/first-amendment-grounds-charlottesville.
3
Blackman, supra note 2; Jacey Fortin, The Statute at the Center of Charlottesville’s
Storm, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/us/charlottesville-rally-protest-statue.html.
4
James Wilson, Charlottesville: Man Charged With Murder Was Pictured at Neo-Nazi
Rally, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 13, 2017, 12:36 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/13/charlottesville-james-fieldscharged-with-was-pictured-at-neo-nazi-rally-vanguard-america.
5
Peter Bergen, Charlottesville Killing Was an Act of Domestic Terrorism, CNN (Aug. 13,
2017, 12:30 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/13/opinions/charlottesville-actof-domestic-terrorism-bergen/index.html; Mark Berman, Was the Charlottesville Car
Attack Domestic Terrorism, a Hate Crime or Both?, WASH. POST (Aug. 14., 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/08/14/was-thecharlottesville-car-attack-domestic-terrorism-a-hate-crime-or-both/; Charlie Savage &
Rebecca R. Ruiz, Sessions Emerges as Forceful Figure in Condemning Charlottesville
Violence, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/us/politics/domestic-terrorismsessions.html.
6
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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nibbling away at a free press through successive bits of
repressive legislation enacted by a nation’s lawmakers.7
Freedom of the press is a cherished freedom enshrined in
the First Amendment and upheld in myriad contexts.8 However,
under the prevailing case law and without a federal shield law,
the executive branch may be able to “annex the journalistic
profession as an investigative arm of government” to reveal its
“confidential” sources as aid to prosecution.9 This would serve
to chill the freedom of the press and conflicts with the spirit of
the First Amendment. 10 In many cases, courts have failed to

7

United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 995 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
U.S. CONST., amend. I; see also Palko v. United States, 302 U.S. 319, 326–27
(1937), overruled on other grounds by McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742
(2010) (“This is true, for illustration, of freedom of thought and speech. Of that
freedom one may say that it is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly
every other form of freedom.”); Peter B. Edelman, Free Press v. Privacy: Haunted by the
Ghost of Justice Black, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1217 (1990) (“If judges have . . . by their
own fiat today created a right of privacy equal to or superior to the right of a free
press that the Constitution created, then tomorrow . . . judges can create more rights
that balance away other cherished Bill of Rights freedoms.” (quoting Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 400 (1967) (Black, J., concurring))); Cynthia D. Love, Sean T.
Lawson, & Avery E. Holton, News from Above: First Amendment Implications of the
Federal Aviation Administration Ban on Commercial Drones, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.
22, 68 (2015) (stating that “our most cherished constitutional rights [are] of free
speech and a free press.”); Kim Ruckdaschel-Haley, Note, The Florida Star v. B.J.F.:
Balancing Freedom of the Press and the Right to Privacy upon Publication of a Rape Victim’s
Identity, 35 S.D. L. REV. 94, 94 (1990) (“Freedom of press and the right to privacy are
cherished values in American society.”).
9
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also id. at
667, 709 (holding that newsmen can be required to testify in state or federal courts in
order to reveal confidential sources); see generally United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d
482, 517 (4th Cir. 2013) (reversing an Eastern District of Virginia ruling supporting
First Amendment and/or common law reporter’s privilege); Jane E. Kirtley,
Reporter’s Privilege in the 21st Century: Despite the Ongoing Controversy Concerning
Adoption of a Federal Reporter’s Privilege Statute, the Idea is Neither New, Nor Novel, 25
DEL. LAW. 12, 13 (2008) (discussing ways in which the government has attempted to
“annex” journalists); Kathryn A. Rosenbaum, Note, Protecting More than the Front
Page: Codifying a Reporter’s Privilege for Digital and Citizen Journalists, 89 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1427 (2014) (discussing the government’s targeting of journalists in
prosecutions and arguing for a federal shield law); Leslie Siegel, Note, Trampling On
The Fourth Estate: The Need For A Federal Reporter Shield Law Providing Absolute
Protection Against Compelled Disclosure Of News Sources And Information, 67 OHIO ST.
L.J. 469 (2006) (arguing for a federal shield law while discussing Branzburg and
subsequent cases).
10
U.S. CONST., amend. I.; see also Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the
Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L. REV. 515, 561 (2007) (noting “just as the lack of a
privilege would chill communications between psychologists and their patients and
prevent the information litigants seek from ever coming into evidence, the lack of a
journalist privilege will chill communications from sources”); Robert T. Sherwin,
Comment, “Source” of Protection: The Status of the Reporter’s Privilege in Texas and a Call
to Arms for the State’s Legislators and Journalists, 32 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 137 (2000)
(discussing the news industry’s argument that compelling disclosures chills news
sources).
8
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extend the common law to such protection, 11 so the legislative
branch should step in to make such protection clear. For
example, in the high stakes field of national security, the
Government utilizes federal laws (such as the Espionage Act)12
to prosecute. State shield laws provide inconsistent and
insufficient protection against federal prosecution.13 The case for
a federal shield law is heightened in the matters of national
security, which is different, and where, arguably, the stakes are
higher.14
II.

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

An informed populace is a hallmark of the American
representative democracy. 15 The free press is a necessary and
integral part of informing the populace. 16 As District Judge
Warren noted, the free press can be obliterated by broad strokes,
or little by little. 17 In addition to the threat of government
overreach, the free press also faces threats from the importance
of headlines and ratings; an ever-expanding and amorphous
11

See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667; Sterling, 724 F.3d at 517; see generally Laurence
B. Alexander, Looking Out For The Watchdogs: A Legislative Proposal Limiting the
Newsgathering Privilege to Journalists in the Greatest Need Of Protection For Sources And
Information, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 97 (2002) (arguing for a narrowly-tailored
federal shield law); Protecting the New Media: Application of the Journalist’s Privilege to
Bloggers, in Developments in the Law: The Law of Media, 120 HARV. L. REV. 996 (2007)
(discussing shield laws and bloggers).
12
The Espionage Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-24 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
792 (2012)).
13
See generally William E. Lee, Probing Secrets: The Press and Inchoate Liability for
Newsgathering Crimes, 36 AM. J. CRIM. L. 129 (2009) (discussing state shield laws, the
Espionage Act, and related issues); W. Cory Reiss, Crime That Plays: Shaping a
Reporter’s Shield to Cover National Security in an Insecure World, Comment, 44 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 641 (2009) (arguing for a federal shield law that balances competing
governmental interest in national security).
14
See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 n.23 (1967) (“Whether
safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth
Amendment in a situation involving the national security is a question not presented
by this case.”).
15
U.S. CONST., amend. I; Chief Justice R. Fred Lewis, A Call to Justice: The
Importance of Civic Education, 80 FLA. B.J. 12, 13 (2006) (“[W]ithout a populace
informed about their civic duties, the rights and freedoms promised by our
constitutional structure may not be realized.”); Dianne Post, Soundoff: Failing Grade,
50 ARIZ. ATT’Y 8, 8 (May 2014) (“In order for a democracy to flourish, it needs an
educated populace who have been taught the basic values of the country, the political
process and factual knowledge.”).
16
See generally Monica Langley & Lee Levine, Branzburg Revisited: Confidential Sources
and First Amendment Values, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 13 (1988) (noting the importance
of a free press in informing citizens); Joel G. Weinberg, Supporting the First
Amendment: A National Reporter’s Shield Law, 31 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 149 (2006)
(discussing, in part, the important role the press plays in keeping the citizenry
informed).
17
United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 995 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
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definition of what is a journalist; and in the specific case of
national security—legitimate tension with government and
public safety interests.18 This Article argues that reinvigorating
and revising the case for a federal shield law will solve this
problem, especially in matters related to national security.
A. News Industry Challenges
The news media is focused on headlines and ratings in the
current environment, distracting in many cases from an actual
search for the truth.19 In a 2015 talk, Lara Setrakian argues that
there are three ways to fix the problems in the news industry
which include building a news that is “built on deep-domain
knowledge,” with a “kind of Hippocratic oath for the news
industry, a pledge to first do no harm,” and one able to “embrace
complexity . . . to make sense of a complex world.” 20 These
recommendations frame the aspirational side of this argument,
which is that the argument desires a noble and diligent press.21
This also raises the question of how to define what or who makes
up the press, what or who is a journalist, and should those
classifications further constrain what or who gets the protections
proposed herein. 22 In making such a determination, questions
arise as to how inclusive to make the definition and whether the
press should enjoy protections that the citizenry otherwise does
not enjoy.23
These issues also raise the question of journalistic
integrity and editorial discretion.24 The “Russia Dossier” about
then-President-elect Trump, allegedly obtained by CNN and
BuzzFeed, shows an example of the type of question faced by the
news industry and an opportunity to exercise editorial
discretion. 25 Specifically, BuzzFeed published a document
18

See generally, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Government Secrecy vs. Freedom of the Press, 1
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 185 (2007) (comparing government interest and freedom of
the press).
19
Lara Setrakian, 3 Ways to Fix a Broken News Industry, TED (Jan. 2017),
https://www.ted.com/talks/lara_setrakian_3_ways_to_fix_a_broken_news_industry
.
20
Id.
21
See, e.g., Stephen Daly, Refrain from Crude Behavior: The Need for Journalism Standards
in Documentary Filmmaking, 31 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1 (2014) (arguing that
journalistic ethics should be part of defining a journalist under shield laws); see also
SPJ Code of Ethics, SOC’Y OF PROF’L JOURNALISTS,
https://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp (last revised Sept. 6, 2014, 4:49 PM).
22
See discussion infra Section IV.A.
23
See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Rosenbaum, supra note 9.
24
SPJ Code of Ethics, supra note 21; Setrakian, supra note 19.
25
Sydney Ember & Michael M. Grynbaum, BuzzFeed Posts Unverified Claims on
Trump, Igniting a Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/10/business/buzzfeed-donald-trumprussia.html?src=mv.
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“carrying explosive, but unverified, allegations about ties
between the Russian government and President-elect Donald J.
Trump.” 26 At the same time, other news media outlets either
declined to report on the document at all (such as Lawfare), or
reported only about the existence of such an unverified
document (such as CNN). 27 This example underscores an
important motivator for the news industry (as discussed by
Setrakian): the tension between a search for truth and ratings.28
This tension further casts light on an important question
regarding classifying journalists (and whether they should have
different protections), particularly in the context of arguing for,
as here, additional legal protections for journalists.29
B. National Security Tensions
Courts have routinely held that there are instances in
which national security interests change a court’s analysis of a
legal issue.30 This analysis contributes to increased tension when
26

Id.
Id.
28
Compare Scott Campbell, BBC is a Slave to Ratings and Copies Us, Says ITV,
TELEGRAPH (Jan. 14, 2014, 6:00 AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/mediatechnologyandtelecoms/
media/10569856/BBC-is-a-slave-to-ratings-and-copies-us-says-ITV.html, with
Andrew Selbst, The Journalism Ratings Board: An Incentive-Based Approach to Cable News
Accountability, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 467 (2011) (assuming the decline of the
news media and proposing an accountability mechanism).
29
See generally Clay Calvert, And You Call Yourself a Journalist?: Wrestling with a
Definition of “Journalist” in the Law, 103 DICK. L. REV. 411 (1999) (discussing the
challenge of defining journalist in law); Stephanie J. Frazee, Note, Bloggers as
Reporters: An Effect-Based Approach to First Amendment Protections in a New Age of
Information Dissemination, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 609 (2006) (discussing whether
bloggers are reporters).
30
See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 363 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(“In joining the Court’s opinion, I note the Court’s acknowledgment that there are
circumstances in which it is reasonable to search without a warrant . . . . We should
not require the warrant procedure and the magistrate’s judgment if the President of
the United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has considered the
requirements of national security and authorized electronic surveillance as
reasonable.”); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1953) (noting that
government privilege exists when there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of
evidence will expose matters which, in the interest of national security should not be
divulged, if so privilege is absolute (i.e., not subject to other party’s countervailing
interest)); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 598
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The power to seize . . . has been restricted to
particular circumstances such as ‘time of war or when war is imminent,’ the needs of
‘public safety’ or of ‘national security or defense,’ or ‘urgent and impending need.’”);
Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 635–38 (Jackson, J., concurring) (outlining, in a famous
concurrence, executive branch powers and developing a framework where executive
power falls into three categories: action with express or implied authority, action
contrary to express or implied congressional action, and action in the absence of
congressional action.); United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972)
(leaving open the question of whether there is a national security or foreign
intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment); Totten v. United States, 92 U.S.
27
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it comes to freedom of the press related to news about national
security matters. 31 In further articulating this balance, Justice
Stewart noted in his concurrence, “the hallmark of a truly
effective internal security system would be the maximum
possible disclosure, recognizing that secrecy can best be
preserved only when credibility is truly maintained.” 32 This
shows one learned jurist’s viewpoint that secrecy in national
security and government transparency are interdependent.33 This
also brings forth the question of where whistleblowers and
leakers fall into this discussion, 34 ultimately leading to the
question of whether a reporter should be able to protect the
identity of such individuals in the context of reporting on
national security matters. To be absolutely clear, the argument
presented herein does not seek to protect any criminal activities,
especially not those such as the unauthorized disclosure of
classified information or the possession of stolen property.35
C. Summary of Analysis and Recommendations
Based upon the aforementioned discussion, this Article
reinvigorates the argument in favor of a federal reporter’s shield
law, specifically implemented as an evidentiary privilege under
the Federal Rules of Evidence. In making this case, Section III
will look at the background and context of the argument for and
against a federal shield law, including surveying a collection of
states’ shield laws. Section III will also include a review of select
previous efforts to enact a federal shield law and consider why
such efforts did not succeed. Finally, Section III will consider the
executive branch’s recourse embodied by the ability to prosecute,
acknowledging a number of mechanisms by which it can be
done.
In Section IV, this Article will examine the integrity of the
press and delve briefly into the question of how to define a
105, 107 (1875) (holding that public policy forbids the trial of something which
would reveal state secrets); In re Directives [redacted text] Pursuant to Section 105B
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1012 (FISA Ct. Rev.
2008) (holding that “a foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement exists when surveillance is conducted to obtain foreign
intelligence for national security purposes and is directed against foreign powers or
agents of foreign powers reasonably believed to be located outside the United
States”); see generally Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d. 1070 (9th Cir.
2010) (en banc) (granting a huge deference to the government in considering Totten
bar or Reynolds privilege).
31
Stone, supra note 18.
32
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971).
33
Id.
34
See generally, e.g., Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The
Press and National Security Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233 (2008) (discussing the press,
whistleblowers, and national security).
35
See discussion infra Section IV.
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journalist (including the necessary corollary of whether the press
should enjoy protections herein that are not otherwise available
to the general public). Section IV will also examine deficits of
state reporters’ shield laws, including their ineffectiveness against
federal prosecution, the challenge of jurisdiction, and the related
question of inconsistent application of the protection. Finally,
Section IV will acknowledge the tension between protecting a
reporter and allowing the Government to fully prosecute
national security-related crimes.
Section V will make the recommendation of a federal
shield law. Section V will address the challenge of how to define
the scope of the protections, note that it should have civil and
criminal applications, and note that this law should not protect
otherwise illegal activity. Finally, this Article will conclude
acknowledging the numerous challenges outside the scope of this
discussion but argue that they are nonetheless addressed by the
solution proposed herein.
III.

SHIELD LAWS & BRANZBURG

The discussion about a federal reporters’ shield law
begins with a survey of state shield laws, an examination of how
they function, and where they are found within the state
statutory framework. 36 This survey necessarily leads to the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Branzburg v. Hayes, 37 and related
cases, 38 which will be discussed in greater detail. 39 That
discussion will lead to review of previous attempts to enact a
federal shield law.40 Finally, one must consider a note on how
the executive branch may pursue enforcement of its national
security secrets, after which the discussion can move on to
implementation.41
A. State Shield Laws
According to the Digital Media Law Project, as of
“December 2007, thirty-two states and the District of Columbia
36

See, e.g., Laurence B. Alexander & Ellen M. Bush, Shield Laws on Trial: State Court
Interpretation of the Journalist’s Statutory Privilege, 23 J. LEGIS. 215 (1997) (discussing
state shield laws generally); Shield Laws and Protections of Sources by State, REPORTERS
COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-lawresources/guides/reporters-privilege/shield-laws (last visited May 3, 2018)
(displaying, in map form, the existence and type of shield laws among the fifty
states); see also discussion infra Section III.A.
37
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
38
E.g., United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482 (4th Cir. 2013).
39
See discussion infra Section III.B.
40
See discussion infra Section III.C.
41
See Stone, supra note 18; discussion infra Sections III–IV.
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have statutory shield laws.” 42 The Digital Media Law Project
further asserted that, “a number of state courts have also
recognized a privilege based on their state constitutions,
common law, or the First Amendment.” 43 According to
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, “[m]any states
have recognized a reporter’s privilege based on state law . . . [i]n
addition to case law, 31 states and the District of Columbia have
enacted statutes—shield laws—that give journalists some form
of privilege against compelled production of confidential or
unpublished information.” 44 While many states have unique
legal underpinnings to this protection, it is useful to specifically
look at three states, each of which has a different approach. In
New York, the reporters’ protections are found in civil rights
law.45 In California, this protection can be found in the evidence
code.46 In Maryland, the protection is found under “Courts and
Judicial Proceedings.”47
New York’s provision operates as an exemption from
being adjudged in contempt,48 with a waiver provision for the
journalist. 49 The statute first provides a number of key
definitions.50 The New York law defines a professional journalist
as:
one who, for gain or livelihood, is engaged in
gathering, preparing, collecting, writing, editing,
filming, taping or photographing of news intended
for a newspaper, magazine, news agency, press
association or wire service or other professional
medium or agency which has as one of its regular
functions the processing and researching of news
intended for dissemination to the public; such
person shall be someone performing said function
either as a regular employee or as one otherwise
professionally affiliated for gain or livelihood with
such medium of communication51
42

State Shield Laws, DIG. MEDIA LAW PROJECT, http://www.dmlp.org/state-shieldlaws (last visited Apr. 15, 2017).
43
Id.
44
The Reporter’s Privilege Compendium: An Introduction, REPORTER’S COMM. FOR
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, https://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-lawresources/guides/reporters-privilege/introduction (last visited Apr. 1, 2018).
45
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 2018).
46
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 2018).
47
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (West 2017).
48
CIV. RIGHTS §§ 79-h(b)–(c).
49
See 81 N.Y. JUR. 2D Newspapers § 36 (2018).
50
CIV. RIGHTS § 79-h(a).
51
Id. § 79-h(a)(6).
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The New York law then provides two exemptions from
contempt, an “absolute protection for confidential news,”52 and
a “qualified protection for nonconfidential news.” 53 To
summarize the protection, a “professional journalist” having
been working for a qualifying type of news organization (defined
in the statute), is exempt from being found in contempt in
criminal or civil proceedings for refusing to disclose “any news
obtained or received in confidence or the identity of the source
of any such news coming into such person's possession in the
course of gathering or obtaining news for publication.”54 If the
person receives such information not in confidence, then the
qualified protection of Section 79-h(c) applies, which requires the
party seeking to compel such testimony to show that:
the news: (i) is highly material and relevant; (ii) is
critical or necessary to the maintenance of a
party’s claim, defense or proof of an issue material
thereto; and (iii) is not obtainable from any
alternative source.55
The statute also has a few other provisions, including that
information obtained in violation of Section 79-h is inadmissible
(including “in any action or proceeding or hearing before any
agency”);56 that protected persons cannot be fined or imprisoned
for failure to disclose information protected by Section 79-h(b) or
(c);57 and that privilege extends to certain third parties such as
supervisors or employers. 58 Section 79-h also includes a
voluntary waiver provision.59
In California, the protections are found as a privilege
under the California Evidence Code. 60 The “Refusal to disclose
news source” section is found in the California Evidence Code’s
section on privileges at Section 1070.61 Section 1070 does not
include a section on definitions, but does include one
definition. 62 Section 1070 states that the protections therein
52

Id. § 79-h(b).
Id. § 79-h(c).
54
Id. § 79-h(b).
55
Id. § 79-h(c).
56
Id. § 79-h(d).
57
Id. § 79-h(e).
58
Id. § 79-h(f).
59
Id. § 79-h(g).
60
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 2018).
61
Id.
62
Id. § 1070(c) (defining “unpublished information” as “information not
disseminated to the public by the person from whom disclosure is sought, whether or
not related information has been disseminated and includes, but is not limited to, all
notes, outtakes, photographs, tapes or other data of whatever sort not itself
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provided apply to, “[a] publisher, editor, reporter, or other
person connected with or employed upon a newspaper,
magazine, or other periodical publication, or by a press
association or wire service, or any person who has been so
connected or employed.”63 The California Evidence Code then
exempts such persons from being adjudged in contempt “for
refusing to disclose . . . the source of any information procured .
. . or for refusing to disclose any unpublished information.”64 The
protections again apply when the protected person is acting in
his/her capacity as news media.65 Section 1070(b) extends those
protections to radio or television news reporters, but does not
appear to include any voluntary waiver provision. 66 The
California approach also has mixed results, as discussed in
Delaney v. Superior Court.67
The Maryland News Media Privilege is found in the
Maryland Code under the heading “Courts and Judicial
Proceedings,” specifically at Title 9, Witnesses. 68 The News
Media Privilege is codified at Section 9-112 and includes
definitions and provisions for compelled disclosure.69 Section 9112 specifically applies to persons who fall under one of three
categories: employed by the news media as defined in the statute,
independent contractors of the news media, and students
engaged with the news media organizations. 70 The Maryland
Code defines the type of information covered by this privilege,
which includes sources of information as well as information
gathered for the news, but not published.71 However, unlike New
York and California, Maryland has a specific section for
compelled disclosure.72 In order to compel disclosure, the court
disseminated to the public through a medium of communication, whether or not
published information based upon or related to such material has been
disseminated”).
63
Id. § 1070(a).
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. § 1070(b).
67
50 Cal. 3d. 785 (1990); see also Timothy L. Alger, Comment, Promises Not to be Kept:
The Illusory Newsgatherer’s Privilege in California, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 155, 177–78
(1991) (expressing skepticism in the effectiveness of the California Reporter’s Shield
privilege); Ian W. Craig, Note, Delaney v. Superior Court: Balancing the Interests of
Criminal Defendants and Newspersons Under California’s Shield Law, 22 PAC. L.J. 1371,
1397–98 (1991) (examining the California Supreme Court’s application of the
California Shield Law in a specific case).
68
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (West 2017).
69
Id.
70
Id. § 9-112(b). “News media” is defined as “(1) Newspapers; (2) Magazines; (3)
Journals; (4) Press associations; (5) News agencies; (6) Wire services; (7) Radio; (8)
Television; and (9) Any printed, photographic, mechanical, or electronic means of
disseminating news and information to the public.” Id. § 9-112(a).
71
Id. § 9-112(c).
72
Id. § 9-112(d).
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must find by clear and convincing evidence: relevance to the
issue at hand; that the information “could not, with due
diligence, be obtained by any alternate means”; and an
“overriding public interest in disclosure.”73 It does note that this
provision cannot be used to compel disclosure of sources
protected under Section 9-112(c)(1) and that the protected person
does not waive protection from compulsion by otherwise
disseminating the information gained hereby.74 Maryland also
claims to have the first state shield law, but not necessarily the
most effective.75
B. The Problem with Branzburg
In 1972, the Supreme Court held that “requiring
newsmen to appear and testify before state or federal grand juries
[does not] abridge[] the freedom of speech and press guaranteed
by the First Amendment.”76 This example further makes a case
for the importance of a federal shield law, in part by the
boundaries it draws among what protections are inherent under
the First Amendment’s guarantee of the freedom of expression
and of the press. The legislative branch should pursue legislation
that makes these protections clear, and eliminates the tension left
by Branzburg.
Paul M. Branzburg was a reporter employed by the
Courier-Journal, a newspaper in Louisville, Kentucky. 77 In
November of 1969, the Courier-Journal published a story by
Branzburg, which described two individuals making hashish,
included a photograph of “a pair of hands working above a
laboratory table on which was a substance identified by the
caption as hashish,” and included that the author promised to
protect their identity. 78 Branzburg was then subpoenaed by a
state grand jury; he appeared, and he refused to identify the
individuals from his story. 79 A state trial court judge ordered
Branzburg to answer, and he appealed under the First
Amendment, the Kentucky Constitution, and Kentucky’s
reporters’ privilege statute, Ky. Rev. Stat. Section 421.100.80 The
73

Id.
Id. § 9-112(e).
75
Id.; see also Timothy M. Mulligan, The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland to the Press
Shield Law: “Good Night, and Good Luck, 41 U. BALT. L.F. 1 (2010) (noting that
Maryland’s shield law was originally passed in 1896 but that current treatment by the
courts has been less than absolute).
76
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972).
77
Id.
78
Id. at 667–68.
79
Id. at 668.
80
Id.; Kentucky’s Evidence Code includes § 421.100, entitled “Newspaper, radio or
television broadcasting station personnel need not disclose source of information,”
74
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Kentucky Court of Appeals held, in part, that while the privilege
allowed a newsman to refuse to divulge a source, it did not
permit the reporter to refuse to testify about what “he had
observed personally, including the identities of those persons he
had observed.”81
In a separate case, which was consolidated during appeal,
Branzburg reported on drug use in Frankfurt, Kentucky. 82
Branzburg was again subpoenaed to testify regarding, in this
case, “the matter of violation of statutes concerning use and sale
of drugs.”83 Branzburg sought to quash the subpoena, meeting
with mixed results.84 Specifically, he was directed to testify to
things that he observed, but was allowed to protect the
confidential sources. 85 The Kentucky Court of Appeals held
consistent with the prior case, and Branzburg sought writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, which was
granted. 86 Branzburg also included cases out of Massachusetts
and California.87
As the Supreme Court noted, “[t]he heart of the claim is
that the burden on news gathering resulting from compelling
reporters to disclose confidential information outweighs any
public interest in obtaining the information.”88 Concurrently, the
Court noted that First Amendment jurisprudence clearly did not
“invalidate every incidental burdening of the press that may
result from the enforcement of civil or criminal statutes of general
applicability.”89 The Court then outlined a number of limits to
the First Amendment protection of a free press, specifically
including:
that the press is not free to publish with impunity
everything and anything it desires to publish.
Although it may deter or regulate what is said or
which simply provides, “No person shall be compelled to disclose in any legal
proceeding or trial before any court, or before any grand or petit jury, or before the
presiding officer of any tribunal, or his agent or agents, or before the General
Assembly, or any committee thereof, or before any city or county legislative body, or
any committee thereof, or elsewhere, the source of any information procured or
obtained by him, and published in a newspaper or by a radio or television
broadcasting station by which he is engaged or employed, or with which he is
connected.” KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (LexisNexis 2018).
81
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 669.
82
Id.
83
Id. (internal citation omitted).
84
Id. at 669–70.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 671.
87
Id. at 671–79.
88
Id. at 681.
89
Id. at 682.
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published, the press may not circulate knowing or
reckless falsehoods damaging to private reputation
without subjecting itself to liability for damages,
including punitive damages, or even criminal
prosecution.90
The Court went on to attempt to put the question into the context
of whether the press had certain privileges of access or
confidentiality.91
Justice Stewart, in dissent, lamented the Court’s view of
a reporter’s protection under the First Amendment, writing,
“[n]ot only will this decision impair performance of the press’[s]
constitutionally protected functions, but it will, I am convinced,
in the long run, harm rather than help the administration of
justice.”92 Justice Stewart went on to note “the guarantee [of a
free press] is ‘not for the benefit of the press so much as for the
benefit of all of us.’” 93 Justice Stewart further opined that the
right to a free press included certain other rights that the Court
was not upholding, including the right to truly protect the
information-gathering process, notably including informants and
confidential sources. 94 Finally, and most presciently, Justice
Stewart noted that “[a]fter today’s decision, the potential
informant can never be sure that his identity or off-the-record
communications will not subsequently be revealed through the
compelled testimony of a newsman.”95
The problem with Branzburg, therefore, is that it creates
an artificial and false dichotomy between a reporter’s ability to
protect confidential sources and the reporter’s obligation to
testify about facts (to include the source’s identity) that he or she
personally knows or observes. This is a distinction without a
difference. Where reporters are faced with a Hobson’s choice,
they can protect their source’s identity, unless they have seen,
met, or know whom the source is—in that case they can be
compelled to testify to what they know.

90

Id. at 683–84 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964);
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130, 147 (1967); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 277 (1971)).
91
Id. at 683–87.
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Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 726 (citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967)).
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Id. at 727–29.
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Id. at 731.
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C. Prior Attempts at a Federal Shield Law
Several efforts to enact a federal shield law have failed,96
and at least one scholar has argued that the time for such a law
has passed. 97 For example, in 2007, a bill was brought to the
senate called the Free Flow of Information Act of 2007. 98 A
companion bill was passed in the House of Representatives,99 but
the Free Flow of Information Act of 2007 ultimately failed
cloture in the Senate and died in the 110th Congress.100 The Act
started with a section on compelled disclosures from “covered
persons,” which set forth due process that would be required in
order to compel a covered person to testify or provide
documents.101 Specifically, a federal court would have to make
three findings, by a preponderance of the evidence.102
First, a court would have to find that the party seeking
disclosure had exhausted all other reasonable sources. 103 The
second finding required was split into whether or not the matter
dealt with a criminal investigation or prosecution; if it did, then
the party seeking disclosure would have to show that there were
“reasonable grounds” to believe a crime occurred, the disclosure
was essential to the prosecution, and that (in the case of leaking
related to classified information) the leak “caused significant,
clear, and articulable harm to the national security.”104 If not a
criminal case, the finding is simply that the disclosure sought is
“essential to the resolution of the matter.”105 Finally, the court
would have to find that nondisclosure would be contrary to the
public interest. 106 The proposed legislation then had several
exceptions, including those disclosures related to “criminal or
tortious conduct . . . to prevent death, kidnapping, or substantial
96

Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, S. 2035, 110th Cong. (2007) (passed by the
House of Representatives, but did not pass a cloture vote in the Senate in 2008); Free
Flow of Information Act of 2013, S. REP. NO. 113-118 (2013).
97
See generally William E. Lee, The Priestly Class: Reflections on a Journalist’s Privilege,
23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 635 (2006) [hereinafter Lee, The Priestly Class]
(concluding that “[u]nfortunately, the current political climate is not conductive to
the enactment of a shield law with a broad class of covered persons. Nor is the
current political climate favorable to the creation of an absolute privilege.”); William
E. Lee, The Demise of the Federal Shield Law, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 27 (2012)
[hereinafter Lee, The Demise of the Federal Shield Law] (discussing that the Supreme
Court is unlikely to revise Branzburg and that Congress appears unwilling to pursue
federal shield law).
98
S. 2035.
99
H.R. 2102, 110th Cong (2007).
100
S. 2035.
101
Id.
102
Id. § 2(a).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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bodily injury . . . to prevent terrorist activity or harm to the
national security.” 107 The proposal also included a definitions
section. 108 Of particular note, the proposal defined “covered
person” as “a person who is engaged in journalism and includes
a supervisor, employer, parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of such
person.”109 The term “journalism” was defined as, “the regular
gathering, preparing, collecting, photographing, recording,
writing, editing, reporting, or publishing of news or information
that concerns local, national, or international events or other
matters of public interest for dissemination to the public.” 110
These definitions stand in stark contrast to the complexity and
nuances addressed in statutes from New York,111 California,112
and Maryland, 113 for example.
While the 2007 bill enjoyed some support, passing in the
House of Representatives, it was unable to survive the Senate
and was opposed by the Bush administration generally and the
Attorney General, Director of National Intelligence, Defense
Secretary, and Secretary of Homeland Security specifically. 114
The bill was re-introduced in the 111th Congress as the Free
Flow of Information Act of 2009,115 but this time failed to even
come out of committee despite the Obama administration’s
support. 116 It is interesting to note that although the Obama
administration had been accused of increasing prosecution of
leakers to a draconian extent, 117 the Obama administration
appears to have fully supported the bill in 2009 and apparently
again in 2013.118
107
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Id. § 8.
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110
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FOX NEWS (Apr. 3, 2008),
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S. 448, 111th. Cong. (2009).
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Law, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/16/us/politics/under-fire-white-house-pushesto-revive-media-shield-bill.html?_r=0; Sean Sullivan et al., White House Pushes Media
Shield Law as Holder Faces Questions on Capitol Hill, WASH. POST (May 15, 2013)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/on-capitol-hill-holder-to-face-questionson-ap-phone-records-irs-scandal/2013/05/15/d0dfc52c-bd70-11e2-89c93be8095fe767_story.html?utm_term=.04cdbb4d2b5b.
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(July 30, 2013, 3:40 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/sealing-loose-lipscharting-obamas-crackdown-on-national-security-leaks.
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Savage, supra note 116; Sullivan et al., supra note 116.
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The Free Flow of Information Act of 2013 119 was
introduced during the 113th Congress with many of the major
features of the Free Flow of Information Acts of 2007 and 2009,
discussed above. There were some changes, however, including
making it more explicit that compelling disclosure specifically
imposed obligations upon the government.120 In addition, the
2013 bill added a requirement for certification by the Attorney
General.121 The 2013 bill also added an affirmative defense to
disclosure if the covered person could, by clear and convincing
evidence, show that disclosure would be contrary to the public
interest. 122 Interestingly, the definition of “covered person”
morphed into “covered journalist” and grew significantly more
nuanced.123 The new definition provided for two types of covered
persons and spanned more than 720 words, 124 while the
definition in the 2007 version of the bill (before amendment) was
twenty-six words. 125 The new definition was much more
expansive in defining the type of organization for which a
“covered journalist” must work and included internal references
to other statutory provisions, such as the Communications Act
of 1934.126 The 2013 bill also provided the types of activities that
a “covered journalist” would be engaged in (interviews, direct
observations) and the intent of such activities. 127 Finally, the
2013 bill had a subsection in the definition that seemed to be
directed specifically at WikiLeaks.128
According to William E. Lee, the efforts at a federal
shield law fail because the Supreme Court “remains committed
to treating the First Amendment’s press and speech clauses as
interchangeable,” meaning that the courts are unlikely to create
such law and that “Congress has been unable to solve the
problem of national security leaks in a manner that garners
bipartisan support.” 129 Lee further argues that Congress will
remain unable to garner sufficient support, in part, because of
119

S. 987, 113th Cong. (2013).
Id. § 2(a)(2).
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Id. § 11(1).
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Id.
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S. 2035, 110th Cong. (2007) (“The term ‘covered person’ means a person who is
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S. 987 § 11(1).
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Id.
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Id. § 11(1)(A)(iii)(I) (stating in part that a “covered journalist . . . does not include
any person or entity . . . whose principal function, as demonstrated by the totality of
such person or entity’s work, is to publish primary source documents that have been
disclosed to such person or entity without authorization”).
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“the emergence of bloggers and ‘citizen-journalists.’” 130 This
Article argues that these are the very reasons that a federal
reporter’s shield law is needed.
D. A Note on Prosecution
Lee’s point is consequential, particularly in the field of
national security where the government interest is great and the
threat considerably grave. 131 However, that is not a sufficient
argument to defeat the benefits provided by a federal shield
law. 132 Rather, Congress can pass or amend legislation that
allows the Government to prosecute the actual crimes
surrounding national security such as the Espionage Act133 or the
Atomic Energy Act.134 Further, the more nuanced definition of
“covered journalist,” under the Free Flow of Information Act of
2013 provided exceptions related to national security and
terrorism. 135 Perhaps more importantly, this fear conflates
leakers with whistleblowers, when they are in fact very
different—one being desirable and the other quite detestable.136
Nonetheless, this supports the argument that the Government
should exercise its prosecutorial discretion, rather than the
argument that crafting a proper shield law is too difficult and
therefore not worthy of the Congress’s time and attention.137
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See, e.g., Beverly E. Bashor, The Liberty/Safety Paradigm: The United States’ Struggle
to Discourage Violations of Civil Liberties in Times of War, 41 W. ST. U.L. REV. 617
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39–40 (2015) (distinguishing, in part, between whistleblowers and leakers).
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WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1277, 1360–61 (2012) (arguing for a federal reporter’s
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OBSTACLES TO A FEDERAL REPORTER’S SHIELD LAW

As discussed through Sections I and II, many scholars
have written on, and professional organizations have called for,
a federal reporter’s shield law. 138 These arguments and
discussions reveal that there are a number of questions that must
be addressed in order to fashion an adequate reporter’s shield law
that effectively supports the freedom of the press while not
unnecessarily protecting criminal activity. The first issue is to
acknowledge the challenge in defining who is a journalist.139 The
next question is whether to be explicit that these protections
should not immunize criminal activity.140 Finally, to support this
argument, it is important to benefit from lessons learned with
state shield laws to overcome their deficits while not protecting
criminal activity of any kind.141
A. Who is a Journalist
The question easiest to ask, but perhaps hardest to frame,
is, who is a journalist?142 Merriam-Webster defines journalist as
“a person engaged in journalism; especially: a writer or editor for
a news medium,” or “a writer who aims at a mass audience.”143
Dictionary.com offers a similar definition: “a person who
practices the occupation or profession of journalism,” defining
journalism as, in part, “the occupation of reporting, writing,
editing, photographing, or broadcasting news or of conducting
any news organization as a business.” 144 The Cambridge
Dictionary offers the following: “someone who collects and

138

See discussion supra Sections I–II.
See discussion infra Section IV.A.
140
See discussion infra Section IV.B.
141
See discussion infra Section IV.C.
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Compare Thomas Kent, Who’s a Journalist: Closing in on a Definition, HUFFPOST
(Oct. 3, 2013, 10:47 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/thomas-kent/whos-ajournalist-closing_b_4033856.html (discussing the evolution of the definition of
“journalist,” including in the law), and A Day in the Life of a Journalist, PRINCETON
REV., https://www.princetonreview.com/careers/85/journalist (last visited Apr. 16,
2017) (“There are many types of journalists, from the local beat newspaper reporter
to the foreign correspondent, the magazine feature writer to the freelance book
reviewer, and so on. It is difficult to pin down the daily routine of an average
journalist.”), with What Does a Journalist Do?, AM. PRESS INST.,
https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/journalism-essentials/what-isjournalism/journalist/ (last visited May 3, 2018) (“Asking who is a journalist is the
wrong question, because journalism can be produced by anyone.”).
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Journalist, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/journalist (last updated Mar. 28, 2018).
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Journalist, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/journalist (last
visited May 3, 2018); Journalism, DICIONARY.COM,
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/journalism (last visited Apr. 3, 2018).
139

2018]

CASE FOR A FEDERAL SHIELD LAW

532

writes news stories and articles for newspapers, magazines,
radio, and television.”145
As discussed above, the various state shield laws have
also, some more meaningfully than others, attempted to define
“journalist.”146 The New York definition starts with the clause,
“one who, for gain or livelihood,” before even discussing what
said person does (“gathering, preparing, collecting, writing,
editing, filming, taping or photographing of news”).147 The New
York definition includes that the activity is carried on, “intended
for dissemination to the public.” 148 The California Evidence
Code, as discussed partially above, does not explicitly include a
definition of journalist, but implicitly identifies that the
protections of Section 1070 apply to a “person connected with or
employed” by certain organizations specified.149 The Maryland
Code also appears to be focused on association or affiliation of
the person at the time of the activity in question, specifically
whether the individual is “employed by the news media in any
news gathering or news disseminating capacity,” including
independent contractors and students.150
The proposals for the Free Flow of Information Acts
(2007, 2009, and 2013) also had evolving definitions of
“journalist.” As discussed above, the initial definition of
“covered person” (standing in the place of “journalist” in the act,
for the purposes of this discussion), was simply a “person who is
engaged in journalism.”151 By the 2009 version, the definition
expanded in complexity and included a number of factors,
including that the person has the “primary intent to investigate
events and procure material in order to disseminate to the public
news or information.”152 The 2009 definition also makes clear
that the term journalist does not include those that can roughly
be described as spies or terrorists.153 Finally, the 2013 definition,
topping out at over 720 words, includes a preliminary clause that
the person is an employee, contractor, or other type of agent of a
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news service. 154 However, the 2013 definition includes other
types of persons, including those with the “primary intent to
investigate issues or events.”155
While a more robust discussion of this issue can fill the
pages of many papers, this more abbreviated analysis reveals a
few key components of the definition, specifically: what does the
individual do, why does the individual do it, and for what or
whose benefit is it done? In determining how important the
definition is, Congress would have to consider whether (as in
Branzburg), the citizenry should enjoy the same protections as the
press.156
B. Doesn’t a Federal Shield Law Protect Criminal Activity?
One argument against a federal shield law is that it
protects criminal activity by, for example, allowing criminals to
shield themselves with or by media exposure.157 While this is a
very real concern when considering an evidentiary privilege, it is
not the intent of a federal reporter’s shield law. For example, as
discussed in Section III above, the Free Flow of Information Act
of 2013 included several exceptions for criminal conduct. 158
Section 3 specifically excepts information “obtained during the
course of, alleged criminal conduct by the covered journalist.”159
The section does include a provision allowing for the
journalist to receive the information, apparently if not otherwise
involved in the criminal activity.160 Section 4 includes a provision
excepting (meaning the journalist does not have protection)
situations to “prevent death, kidnapping, substantial bodily
injury, sex offenses against minors, or incapacitation or
destruction of critical infrastructure,” in a provision reminiscent
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b). 161
Section 5 includes a national security exception, similar to
Section 4, but oriented to “prevent terrorist activity or harm to
the national security.”162 Ultimately, the goal is to draft a law that
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has clear enough boundaries to prevent the unintentional side
effect of immunizing criminal activity.163
C. Deficits of State Shield Laws
There are many potential approaches for states to
implement a reporter’s shield law, such as the approaches
discussed above, 164 but each has many challenges and deficits
related to applicability, uniformity, and complexity.165 One such
problem is that the absence of a federal shield law has led to the
states each pursuing their own approach (or lack thereof), which
results in great disparity in protection from state to state. 166
Further, the state shield laws examined herein did not seem to
have broad application to citizen-journalists, bloggers, or the
like. 167 Moreover, the state laws have arguably distinct
applicability depending on whether they are found in the
evidentiary code, rules of procedure, or other places in the state
code. 168 For example, the New York provision, as discussed
above, also applies to actions before an agency,169 but does the
California evidentiary privilege? Importantly, state shield laws
simply do not protect journalists in federal court, where—
especially with regard to national security—prosecution or
subpoena may be most likely to occur.170
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RECOMMENDATIONS

Given these obstacles and the record of failure in
achieving a federal reporter’s shield law in the 2007, 2009, and
2013 evolutions, a solution is needed that is relatively simple to
apply, but more importantly, can hope to gain bipartisan
support.171 In order to do so, there should be three qualities: a
threshold determination of what constitutes a journalist, a
narrowly defined scope of the protection, and an explicit carve
out for criminal behavior.
A. Threshold Determination of What Constitutes a Journalist
Given the Supreme Court’s rationale in Branzburg,172 and
the previous failed attempts at the Free Flow of Information
Act,173 the threshold determination of what a journalist is needs
to be clear and workable. The previous attempts to make this
determination appear to have failed because of a cobbled
together definition with criteria ranging from whether the
individual is employed by the right type of organization to what
intent the individual has at the time of the activity in question.
These definitions are probably too complicated and likely
focused on the wrong issue if they focus on the individual’s
employment. Rather, the law should be drafted such that the
dispositive criteria are the intent of the individuals (why they are
doing the activity), and whether the individual adheres to an
identifiable journalistic ethic. 174 The intent behind these two
criteria is that it will tend to automatically include those we think
of as traditional journalists (i.e. writers for the New York Times,
correspondents for CNN, etc.), but also provide a path of
inclusion for conscientious bloggers or citizen-journalists.
Whereas it may not include BuzzFeed, when behaving as
discussed above, it could certainly include a blogger who intends
to behave like a “journalist.”175 In other words, the protection
applies to those who behave in the way we would expect a
journalist to behave. This is important because it provides the
type of accountability that is desirable given the scope of
protection in this proposal. Once the protected individuals are
established, it remains to establish the scope of the protection.
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Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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B. Scope of Protection
The protection provided for journalists, as defined above,
should be narrow but nearly absolute. This configuration will
tend to give journalists, and thus the citizenry, a uniform
expectation of what it means to talk to the press in a confidential
manner. To that end, the protection should be nearly absolute,
allowing for very specific exceptions that prevent specific serious
harms (as outlined above in the proposed Free Flow of
Information Act of 2013 176 ). The law should provide a basic
protection for the journalist against the need to reveal his or her
sources. That is the primary protection. The law should be
narrowly drawn in order to only accomplish this goal. Further,
the law should be a combination of an evidentiary privilege and
a broader law. To that end, the law should be drafted similarly
to the New York Section 79-h, but probably also implement an
evidentiary privilege as seen in the California version. This dualapplication of the protection can achieve the goal of effectively
shielding properly defined journalists in the narrow set of
circumstances intended.
C. No Immunity for Criminal Prosecution
Lastly, it is most important to note that the reporter’s
shield law should be carefully drafted so as not to have the effect
of immunizing criminality. As discussed above, there are a
number of ways that criminality could manifest itself, but to
make this point, consider the case of an individual claiming to be
an intelligence community whistleblower who indiscriminately
discloses classified information (leaks in violation of the
Espionage Act) to a blogger (who behaves like a journalist and
would meet the proposed definition). Further assume, arguendo,
that the blogger reasonably believes that the information he or
she has been given (which includes documents) is properly
classified as United States Government documents. If the
blogger, operating in accordance with an articulated journalistic
code of ethics, elects to report about the fact of the disclosures,
but upon demand of the United States Government, and an
appropriate finding by a federal court, returns the documents at
issue to the United States Government, then the proposed
protections should shield the reporter from either being
prosecuted for possession of the documents (since they were
immediately returned after the court’s finding) or compelled to
disclose the source of the information and documents. The shield
law should absolutely not prevent prosecution of the underlying
source; it should simply prevent the executive branch from being
able to “annex the journalistic profession as an investigative arm
176
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of government”177 in order to reveal its “confidential” sources as
aid to prosecution.178
VI.

CONCLUSION

The time for a federal shield law has come. This proposal
seeks to acknowledge the imperative of freedom of the press
while balancing the keen government interest in protecting
national security. The issue of protections that ought to be
afforded to journalists has been obscured on two metrics. First,
in the context—and name—of national security, the
Government has increasingly powerful (if not effective) tools
designed to root out or prosecute individuals with the apparent
ability to enlist the press as an investigative arm by compelling
journalists to disclose sources. It is the federal government and
federal courts that have the most power, and therefore, state law
simply cannot sufficiently guard the diligent journalist. Second,
given the proliferation of internet communication and the ease
by which one purported journalist can reach massive audiences,
it becomes increasingly difficult to adequately define
“journalist,” but increasingly important in order to effectuate
adequate protections. Nonetheless, many states have
endeavored to do so with state shield laws. And the fact that such
an overwhelming majority of states have endeavored to enact
shield laws certainly shows that there is a widespread and public
desire for such protections. To that end, the proposed legislation
would settle the door left open by Branzburg and settle many of
the discussions opened by the scholars cited throughout this
Article. Specifically, it would provide a clearly defined privilege
for reporters that is predictable and consistent throughout its
application across the country. Not only would these protections
benefit the new industry, they would also accommodate the
growing body of non-standard journalists and provide the
government with a predictable and well-defined boundary in
seeking to prevent leaks or prosecute spies and leakers.
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